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ABSTRACT The coronavirus (COVID-19) has appeared as the greatest challenge due to its continuous
structural evolution as well as the absence of proper antidotes for this particular virus. The virus mainly
spreads and replicates itself among mass people through close contact which unfortunately can happen
in many unpredictable ways. Therefore, to slow down the spread of this novel virus, the only relevant
initiatives are to maintain social distance, perform contact tracing, use proper safety gears, and impose
quarantinemeasures. But despite being conceptually possible, these approaches are very difficult to uphold in
densely populated countries and areas. Therefore, to control the virus spread, researchers and authorities are
considering the use of smartphone based mobile applications (apps) to identify the likely infected persons
as well as the highly risky zones to maintain isolation and lockdown measures. However, these methods
heavily depend on advanced technological features and expose significant privacy loopholes. In this article,
we propose a new method for COVID-19 contact tracing based on mobile phone users’ geolocation data.
The proposed method will help the authorities to identify the number of probable infected persons without
using smartphone based mobile applications. In addition, the proposed method can help people take the vital
decision of when to seek medical assistance by letting them know whether they are already in the list of
exposed persons. Numerical examples demonstrate that the proposed method can significantly outperform
the smartphone app-based solutions.
INDEX TERMS Coronavirus, Covid-19, contact tracing, geolocation, pandemic.
I. INTRODUCTION
After World War II, the coronavirus (COVID-19) is being
considered to be themost life-threatening event that happened
in the history of mankind. It is a new family of coronavirus
that changes its RNA structure frequently. As the virus had
spread all on a sudden and the spread rate could not be
predicted in prior, only a few countries have been able to
control the penetration of this virus. The main reason behind
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Derek Abbott .
their successful control was the ability to trace the contacts of
the infected persons promptly and put them into isolation [1].
To slow down the coronavirus spread, three measures have
been proven effective: i) contact tracing, ii) social distancing,
and iii) quarantine. In particular, contact tracing plays a lead-
ing role in containing the spread when the R-value is below
1.0. Since the outbreak began, different countries adopted
different types of contract tracing strategies based on their
socio-economic conditions. A vast majority of these methods
operate through smartphone-based mobile apps. According
to the statistical portal, it has been found that in 2019 almost
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5.07 billion people in the world are using mobile phones
as a medium of communication and an estimated 67% of
the world population has a mobile phone. The statistics also
reports that in 2014 the smartphone users were around 38%
which increased to 50% by the end of 2018. It has been
reported that the number of smartphone users worldwide
today surpasses three billion [2]. From this growth, it is
expected that the number of smartphone users will grow by
one billion in a period of five years [3], [4]. Therefore, contact
tracing can be easily done using mobile phone apps but the
challenge is how the collected data can be handled securely
and what information should be collected [5]. In addition,
people’s willingness to install the apps as well as the avail-
ability of smartphones in all areas of a society is also a major
challenge. According to Ferretti et al. [6] and Zastrow [7],
if 60% of the population of a country install the contact
tracing app, the spread rate will automatically slow down.
After collecting the data, the next obvious question is how
to warn people effectively. Many approaches are now under
consideration such as contact tracing, narrowcasting, broad-
casting, and so on to alert people regarding the possibility
of being infected or tracing the likely infected person’s con-
tact trajectory [8]. Accurate contact tracing data is vital for
providing timely exposure notices. For that purpose, users’
personal information such as mobility, details of the persons
the suspected user contacted, etc. has to be disclosed. The
app can provide the data with reliable accuracy only if the
collected information is sufficient. But more information
leads to increased breach of privacy which is a major concern
these days. For a clear understanding of the privacy concerns
related to smartphone app-based contact tracing, one needs
to know how such apps operate in practice. A typical contact
tracing app works as follows: the app should be installed on
an individual’s cell phone and the Bluetooth of the phone
must always remain on. When two users, having the same
app installed, reach in close proximity, the app exchanges a
unique identifier using Bluetooth which is stored either in
the phone storage or in a centralized database. If a person
is found to be COVID-19 positive, his mobile is taken to
collect all the mobile numbers that had so far been stored in
this mobile, and then those persons are informed as soon as
possible. However, the authors in [9] raised some valid ques-
tions regarding the method being used in the Bluetooth-based
contact tracing app, such as, how the anonymity of a user
be protected from the app provider, how to prevent the
snooper to access individual’s data through this app, what
measure the authority will take in case of contacted persons
after knowing their details and so on. Therefore, not only
finding the infected or likely infected person is enough but
how to inform them or what measures should be taken to
confine them is also important in the pandemic situation.
In addition, solutions that seem effective for some countries
may not be appropriate for other countries due to different
social norms.
To address the aforementioned challenges in smartphone
app-based contact tracing of COVID-19, we propose the idea
of using mobile phone users’ geolocation data, as opposed
to Bluetooth low energy (BLE) based smartphone apps, for
contact tracing. The proposed framework facilitates contact
tracing without necessitating smartphones. Since in many
countries especially in developing countries smartphone pen-
etration rate is significantly low, BLE based technology may
not be very effective in those countries. In the geolocation
based approach proposed in this article, any type of mobile
phone with an active SIM card will work and thus the pro-
posed approach can be equally effective in developing coun-
tries as well as in countries where smartphone penetration rate
is significantly higher. The proposed approach can be con-
sidered as a technology aided concept that can minimize the
spread of the deadly Coronavirus yet preserving the privacy
of the users. In this work, we have also demonstrated practical
benefits of using cellphone networks as a medium of contact
tracing. The procedure is detailed in the following sections.
Meanwhile, the rest of this article is organized as fol-
lows: Section II presents an extensive review of existing sys-
tems, Section III focuses on the details the proposed model,
Section IV compares the proposed model with existing sys-
tems from different viewpoints, then, experimental results
are presented in section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
section VI.
II. REVIEW OF EXISTING SYSTEMS
After the declaration of WHO as COVID-19 outbreak a
public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC)
on 30th January 2020 [10], [11] and a pandemic on 11th
March 2020 [12], many countries developed different contact
tracing apps to monitor and control the spread in the coun-
try. According to a CNN report, the Health Code app [13]
that is being used in many parts of China works as fol-
lows: the app asks people about their symptom as well as
their travel history, the possibility of being in contact with
a COVID-19 positive patient, their workplaces, residential
addresses, phone numbers, passport numbers, national iden-
tity number, etc. will be verified. After verification, a color
code will be sent to the person’s mobile phone named as
‘‘QR Code’’ whose color can be either red, green or amber.
Users with red code will have to go under government quar-
antine or self-quarantine for 14 days, users with amber code
will go to quarantine for 7 days but users with green code
are considered to be risk-free. The major problem in this
app is if a person intentionally provides wrong information
regarding his travel information or symptom or being in close
contact with a COVID-19 positive patient, then he will get a
green code and will likely affect more people before being
identified.
South Korea was among the first few countries that
were affected by the novel coronavirus after China. Hence,
in South Korea, the first confirmed cases were reported on
20th January 2020 [14]. Even though in the initial stage the
number of affected people in South Korea was quite high but
they didn’t go for any lockdown or roadblock or aggressive
immigration control strategy. Rather they used a trace, test,
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and treat strategy which proved very effective as within a
short period the curve of newly confirmed cases, as well
as deaths, had been flattened at around mid-March [15].
To control the spreading, the Government of South Korea sent
all the travelers who came from abroad into self-quarantine.
During the quarantine state, the travelers forcefully used a
self-diagnosis app and updated their health status regularly
so that the Government can trace whether there are any sus-
pected symptoms [16]. At the same time, the government also
sent all of the individuals who had direct contact with those
travelers to self-quarantine as well and followed the same
monitoring scheme. But the main problem in this tracing
process arose when the collected data was shared among
many authorities such as police, health insurance, central
government agencies, health care professionals, health care
associations, and others. Hence, it is a direct violation of data
privacy law in South Korea [15]. But during the pandemic
situation, such law can be relaxed and that was what South
Korea did at that time. Besides, it was suggested that if such
a situation happens again, aggregated data rather than an
individual’s can be shared to all the concerned sectors to
control the misuse of data [15].
In March 2020, Singapore Ministry of Health first
released a contact tracing app called ‘‘TraceTogether’’ and its
BLE-based protocol BlueTrace [17] where the tracing will
be done through mobile phones’ Bluetooth technology. For
tracking purpose, a person has to install the app, and Blue-
tooth must be turned on always. A unique token is generated
in the person’s mobile during installation. Whenever two
persons are in close proximity their phone will exchange that
token through Bluetooth and preserve that token number in
the phone storage [18].
The Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing
(PEPP-PT) [19], a joint project betweenGermany, France and
Italy, proposed a centralized data center based on Bluetooth
low energy (BLE)-based tracing technique where any traveler
travelling within EU countries can use the same app to let the
government know his contacted persons’ list without needing
any additional contact tracing app.
There are several major problems in the BLE-based trac-
ing systems following both centralized and decentralized
approaches. First, if the person does not use a smartphone fea-
turing Bluetooth connectivity, then there is no way he or she
can be traced. We acknowledge that in a first world country
like Singapore or Germany, most of the people use smart-
phones but not necessarily everyone keeps the Bluetooth
connectivity enabled in his/her device at all time. Second,
although Bluetooth technology is considered as a cheap,
reliable, and low power consuming option, any malicious
user may access the information stored in the mobile devices
through the Bluetooth link [20]–[22]. In [21], Naveed et al.
explained the security issues of using mobile Bluetooth tech-
nology for android devices and in [23] the authors showed
the security issues in the iOS platform. Data privacy is thus a
major concern in Bluetooth based apps. For any contact trac-
ing app, the main goal is to inform the person that he or she
has been exposed to the virus. However, with Bluetooth-based
apps, even if the person has not been in touch with any
infected person but within the Bluetooth range of the person,
the user of the phone will be flagged as a suspected one
and may be subject to social bullying. It may also create a
mass confusion if the number of such false alarm increases
significantly. On the other hand, if we consider the scenario
of a developing country like Bangladesh, Nigeria etc., where
coronavirus is creating phobia among people as medical
facilities to support the massive number of patients are not
adequate and many hospitals are not even treating patients
with other problems due to the suspicion of coronavirus, this
type of contract tracing app will create mass panic rather than
mass awareness and people will face social harassment.
In general, two types of data can be collected by using these
apps, one is ‘‘proximity’’ which will show with whom the
user has been in contact and ‘‘location’’ which will show in
which area the user has roamed [8]. Both may cause false
positive alarms and false-negative alarms [8]. A false-positive
alarm will happen if the person who is identified being in
contact either by location information or contact information
may just pass the area at that time and didn’t even come in
direct contact with the infected person. A false-negative alarm
means the app is failing to identify any suspected person
which may happen due to many reasons as we have discussed
earlier.
Interestingly, many existing works suggest decentralized
solutions because less sensitive data can then be shared with
central authorities and thus the end user’s privacy can be pre-
served [24], [25]. However, the risk of the decentralized solu-
tion compared to the centralized solution is still a trade-off
and beyond the scope of this work.
While most of the contact tracing apps are now using
the BLE-based tracing technique, some researchers are also
thinking about storing user’s mobility information and only
hand over this information only when found COVID-19 pos-
itive [26]. In terms of data security and privacy, this is more
secure as logging the location without the contact’s stored
information is less private.
In [27], the authors proposed a Bluetooth based contact
tracing app ‘‘CONTAIN’’ where they showed that the identity
of the user will be completely anonymous and at the same
time, they experimented different timing of turning the Blue-
tooth on (random, decentralized, centralized) of the mobile to
compare the results. They found in their experimental results
that even if the Bluetooth is turned on, only when the user
goes to any public gathering, the performance of the app is
better than if it is turned on randomly during different times
of the day.
Most of the COVID-19 contact tracing apps released so
far are based on location/ proximity-based contact tracing,
location-based hotspot reporting, and self-reported symptom
tracking [17], [19], [24]–[36]. On the other hand, if the
location data can be obtained from cellular mobile phone
networks, then the issues related to the BLE-based tracing
technique can be eliminated as well as the technological
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requirements (e.g. phones with Bluetooth and smart features)
can be waived. The authors of [37] have proposed an outdoor
location tracking technique of mobile devices in a cellular
network. They have shown that the proposed technique is
nearly 88% accurate. In urban areas, the tracking perfor-
mance is the best with median accuracies of up to 112m.
It is also found that the cellular systems show promising
positioning performance in indoor environments as well [38].
The authors of [39] have presented field test results in differ-
ent scenarios e.g., cell phone network location system, gps
location system and Google location services for measuring
the accuracy of mobile device based location services. They
have found the highest accuracy of 3.20 meter with the gps
based location services. A more recent study in [40] suggests
that achievable positional accuracies of mobile geolocation
data range from 1.90 to 2.26m (median 2.11m) in urban open
areas. So, it can be concluded based on practical experimental
data that geolocation measurement using mobile networks
coupled with the GPS sensors of mobile phones can be accu-
rate, reliable and efficient for COVID-19 contact tracing.
In this article, we propose a contact tracing approach
using cellular sim card geolocation data as opposed to the
BLE-based tracing techniques. In the proposed model, a con-
firmed COVID19 patient’s mobile number will be passed to
the corresponding mobile operator to find its mobility infor-
mation for the past 7 days. The operator will use the geoloca-
tion information to trace the mobility as shown in Fig.1.
FIGURE 1. Contact tracing through cell phone network using geolocation
data.
In the proposed model, no Bluetooth/ Wi-Fi/ NFC
enabled cell phone is needed as the operator will use the
geolocation-based tracing approach by getting the location
data directly from the base station to identify the likely
infected persons. This method can avoid panic spread among
people as it does not require continuous warning about their
possibility of getting infected. The responsible authority can
then identify the riskiest persons based on the intensity of
contact with Covid-19 positive patients and instruct them
to go for isolation/test if necessary. In addition, if a per-
son feels to have developed any symptoms of COVID-19,
the proposed method can also perform an initial screening by
checking whether the cell phone number is enlisted in the list
of victims.
III. PROPOSED CONTACT TRACING MODEL
In this section, we present the proposed cell phone
geolocation-based contact tracing model. We structure the
overall framework in three operational phases. Each phase
has specific activities. The phases and their operations are
discussed below. Note that there are some basic requirements
for the proposed method. First of all, the patient has to carry
a cell phone of any type with an active sim card and the sim
card must belong to the patient. Secondly, the phone must be
kept on.
A. PHASE-I : DATA COLLECTION
In this phase, the primary data for the COVID-19 patients
will be collected from the designated test centers. Then the
infected areas will be shown using any map services (e.g.
Google map). The activities to be performed at this stage are
described below and the process is depicted in Fig. 2.
1) STEP 01
Whenever a person visits a COVID-19 test center, two basic
information, such as the current address and the active mobile
phone number(s) must be recorded in the local register of the
test center.
2) STEP 02
If the person is found to be COVID-19 positive, then the
previously recorded information (i.e. address and phone num-
bers) must be reported to the central database.
3) STEP 03
At this point, the number of infected persons in an indi-
vidual area (e.g. Division, District, City, Road, etc.) will be
calculated.
4) STEP 04
An application will be in place (e.g. iOS or Android
App, or Web Application, etc.) where anyone can do a simple
registration with the mobile number. The registered user can
search for a particular location and get the number of infected
persons around it via any map services (e.g. Google map).
B. PHASE-II: IDENTIFYING PROBABLE OCCURRENCES
In the second phase, we focus on how the Government can
identify the likely infected persons. The cell phone number
of the Covid-19 positive patients can be traced to find out the
possible occurrences as shown in Fig. 3. Here, any other cell
phone user who came in near proximity (e.g. 2 meters) to the
infected person during the last 7 days lies in the suspected
list. But the mass people do not need to install any kind of
application as the location data (latitude and longitude) will
be collected from the cell phone network. Therefore, this
process is not limited to the use of smart phones, rather we
can get the data for any type of cell phone (e.g. feature phone)
users. While collecting the location data, we have considered
two cases. Firstly, when the infected persons travel within the
VOLUME 8, 2020 213557
M. T. Rahman et al.: Automated Contact Tracing Approach for Controlling Covid-19 Spread
FIGURE 2. Flow diagram of Phase - I.
FIGURE 3. Finding possible occurrences using geolocation data from mobile phone operators.
FIGURE 4. Flow diagram of Phase-II.
coverage of multiple BSCs (Base Station Controller) under
the home MSC (Mobile Switching Centre), then authorities
need to collect the data only from a single MSC owner.
Secondly, when the infected persons travel between multiple
different MSCs (Mobile Switching Center) owned by multi-
ple service providers, the authorities may need to collect the
complete travel data from all the relevant service providers.
The step-by-step process is illustrated below, and the process
is depicted in Fig. 4.
1) STEP 01
After getting the data (i.e. the list of infected persons) from
the central database, each mobile number will be sent to the
corresponding mobile operator to get the mobility informa-
tion (latitude and longitude) of the respective cell phone users
during the prior 7 days. At the same time, the operator will
also be asked to provide the mobile numbers of the active cell
phone users within those infected persons’ mobility zones
within a given distance.
2) STEP 02
The mobility zone information, acquired from the previous
step, will then be sent to all other operators to identify all of
the active cell phone users inside the zone at that time.
3) STEP 03
All the cell phone numbers (obtained from step 1 and 2) will
be stored in the central database marked as ‘‘possible infected
cell phone numbers’’.
4) STEP 04
If a particular number is found to appear multiple times
in the ‘‘possible infected cell phone numbers’’ list, then
those cell phone users will be instructed to go for isolation/
COVID-19 test as appropriate.
C. PHASE-III: USER’S QUERY
At this phase, if a person feels physically uncomfortable and
wants to go for a test, the application can help to make the
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FIGURE 5. Flow diagram of Phase-III.
FIGURE 6. Overall flow diagram of the proposed system.
decision and predict the intensity. For this purpose, we pro-
pose activities as follows in stepwise and the process is
depicted in Fig. 5.
1) STEP 01
Through the application, any person can search whether
the corresponding cell phone number is enlisted in the sus-
pected list.
2) STEP 02
If the cell phone user is already suspected by the application,
the person will be instructed to answer some questionnaires
which can be taken from [36], [37], [38]. The sample question
set is shown in Table 1.
3) STEP 03
The answers will be verified and analyzed in real-time with a
predefined answer set.
4) STEP 04
Finally, after the analysis, if the person is found to be pos-
sibly infected then the person will be instructed to go for a
COVID-19 test.
TABLE 1. Sample questionnaire.
These three phases are combined to form the proposed
contact tracing method and the overall flow is depicted
in Fig. 6. Note that relying on a centralised database may pose
several security issues such as man in the middle (MITM),
distributed denial of service (DDoS), SQL injection and so
on. However, these threats are common for many centralized
databases. We suggest the use of state-of-the-art defence
mechanisms against any potential attacks. The authors of [41]
have proposed a security model assessment prototype for
databases, a prototype of security management architecture
using blockchain for a database, a database security algorithm
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and a prototype to mitigate cyberattacks. The authors have
shown that the use of a hybrid blockchain model provides
the system with the optimal security such that public organi-
zations in relation to test results performed with a 99.50%
security effectiveness. This model can be considered as a
defence strategy for the proposed approach.
IV. COMPARISON WITH OTHER SOLUTIONS
The strongest aspect of the proposed contact tracing method
is that it is not limited by advanced technological require-
ments (e.g. Smartphone, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, NFC, and so on).
The only requirement is that every individual has to carry
the cell phone with an active sim card. With 5.112 billion
unique mobile users, 67% penetration globally (even higher
in urban areas where COVID-19 has the worst effect), mobile
phone geolocation data seems to be the most viable means
of contact tracing. Recently, a few articles have summarized
different approaches proposed in the literature for minimizing
the spread during this outbreak of COVID-19 [42], [43].
Most of the approaches are modern technology facilitated.
The common approaches are broadcasting, selective broad-
casting, unicasting, participatory sharing, private kit: safe
paths, etc. Each of these approaches has its strengths and
limitations. Raskar et al. have provided a detailed summary
of the approaches named above [42]. We have reviewed the
detailed comparison presented in [42] and analyzed different
aspects of each method. The comparison of strengths and
limitations of existing and the proposed methods is outlined
in Table 2. The comparison factors are illustrated below as
per the proposed model
A. ACCURACY
As the mobility information will be collected from the mobile
operators, it is obvious that the data will be accurate. In the
proposed model, we will not collect the locations verbally.
As a result, we can say that the data will be precise and
accurate.
B. ADOPTION
There will be no adaptability issue as the person does not need
to carry out any predefined activity. People will continue their
day-to-day activities, and what everybody does most of the
time, they will carry their cell phones.
C. PRIVACY
The privacy issues are considered in the viewpoints of car-
riers, local businesses, users of the proposed model, and the
non-users. These issues are discussed below:
1) PRIVACY RISK FOR CARRIERS
There will be no privacy risks for the carriers as the per-
sonal information will not be publicized. Only the infected
count will be made public via any map services (e.g. Google
map). While identifying the adjacent persons of a particular
cell phone user, the location information will not be made
public also because the proposedmodel works in a centralized
TABLE 2. Strength and limitation analysis with other proposed methods.
manner. The location data will be used only for predicting
infection probability of the respective user.
2) PRIVACY RISK FOR LOCAL BUSINESSES
There will be very low privacy risks for the local businesses
as the locations where the carrier visited will not be made
public.
3) PRIVACY RISK FOR USERS
First of all, in every country, mobile service providers are
regulated according to the privacy policies of the correspond-
ing government. In the proposed method, when a patient is
found Covid-19 positive, the system will only store the phone
number of the patient which is accessible to the authorities for
many other reasons. The proposed system does not require
any other personal information (e.g. Name, Father’s Name,
Mother’s Name, Bank Account, National ID Card (NID)
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number etc.). After getting appropriate approval from the
authorities, the system will then collect only the location
points of the user during the last 7 days from themobile phone
operators. Thus, it is apparent that the privacy of the users
will not be compromised as no personal information will be
collected from the mobile service provider or from the mobile
phone itself. On the other hand, in BLE based schemes,
intruders may intercept sensitive private information through
the Bluetooth connectivity.
4) PRIVACY RISK FOR NON-USERS
There may be privacy violations for the non-users as the users
and non-users are somehow connected via social relation-
ships, but this is common for other contact tracing methods
as well. When a person is diagnosed as COVID-19 positive,
the family members or friends may endure the same unin-
tended consequences of the event.
D. CONSENT
The consent issues are considered in terms of the carriers,
businesses and users of the proposed model. These issues are
illustrated below:
1) CONSENT OF CARRIERS
The proposed model is considered to operate in such a way
where the information about the patients will be recorded
before the test of COVID-19. As a result, there will be no
way to hide the details of the carrier afterward. Therefore,
no consent will be needed as it is a casual and normal practice.
2) CONSENT OF LOCAL BUSINESSES
The consent of local businesses in the proposedmodel mainly
depends on the Government policies.
3) CONSENT OF USERS
The consent of the users is required for the proposed model.
During the registration, the user will be asked to provide
the cell phone number. Even when the user wants to check
if he/she made any contact with any COVID-19 patient,
the cell phone number needs to be sent to the operator for
a cross-check.
E. SYSTEMATIC CHALLENGES
The systematic challenges are considered in terms of carriers,
businesses, and users of the proposed model. The issues are
described below:
1) MISINFORMATION
There is a very low risk of misinformation as the location data
will not be taken from any user input. Rather the data will be
collected from the sim card operator.
2) PANIC
The proposed model can reduce panic to some extent as the
users of the model can check the initial status and also the
intensity while staying at home.
3) FRAUD AND ABUSE
It is expected that there will be no fraudulent activities
as the application will not require any open connection
(e.g. Bluetooth, NFC, etc.).
4) SECURITY OF INFORMATION
The proposed model is designed with a view in mind about
the security concerns of the carrier’s as well as the user’s
important information. As only the cell phone number, which
is already a public entity, is needed to operate the proposed
method, there is a very low chance of security holes.
5) EQUAL ACCESS
Equal access is the main strength of the proposed model
as it is not limited by any technological requirement
(e.g. smartphones, battery, certain OS, etc.) rather only a cell
phone is needed.
6) SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS
There are almost no bad impacts on the socioeconomic factors
for the proposed model. Sometimes it is dependent on the
government’s practice if there is any.
Finally, the overall comparison of existing contact trac-
ing approaches with the proposed approach is provided
in Table 2 in terms of major strengths and limitations.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we compare the proposed contact tracing
method with existing technologies through numerical exam-
ples. To understand the real impact of our proposed sys-
tem and to make a realistic comparison with the existing
solutions based on BLE technology, we have generated the
mimic of an actual contact tracing scenario based on some
real statistical measures. In the scenario, we have used the
Poisson Point Process (PPP) for a circular area of radius 1.
We have scaled a distance of 100 meters to unity for ease
of presentation. The percentages of smartphone users and
any type of mobile phone users are considered as the den-
sity parameters of PPP for generating two separate sets of
data. We consider Bangladesh as a typical example of devel-
oping countries to show the practical effectiveness of the
proposed approach. According to the Bangladesh Bureau of
Statistics (BBS) and Bangladesh Statistics 2018, the total
population of Bangladesh is 162.7 Million [44]. According to
the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission
(BTRC), the total number of mobile phone subscribers is
162.290 million [45] and the total number of mobile Internet
subscribers is 93.101 million at the end of April 2020 [46].
As the total number of mobile phone subscribers is almost
identical to the total population, we assume that almost 100%
people have a mobile phone of some kind. Note that the
official data of unique mobile users is not available during
this analysis. We are considering the percentage of smart-
phone users based on the total number of mobile Internet
subscribers. Thus, we can say that almost 58%of Bangladeshi
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people are using smartphones. Without loss of generality,
we assume that people need smartphones to be able to use
the BLE-based tracing app.
Now, we use the value of the density parameter for any type
of mobile phone users as lambda (λ) = 100 and for smart-
phone users as lambda (λ) = 58 in Poisson Point Process.
Based on this assumption, we simulate the data for both type
of mobile phone users in Cartesian two-dimensional space.
We have repeated the simulation four times so that we can
make a reliable inference with a more accurate performance
measure. In order to understand the dispersion of the points,
we use scatter plots (Figs. 7 and 8) and co-variance measures.
FIGURE 7. Scatter plots (four trials) using poisson point process
(lambda = 58).
FIGURE 8. Scatter plots (four trials) using poisson point process
(lambda = 100).
It is apparent that the points in any type of mobile phone
users (Fig. 8) are more condensed than the points simulated
based on only smartphone users (Fig. 7). The covariance
analysis in Table 3 is also supporting this observation to draw
the same inference as the covariance is always smaller for
the points in any type of mobile phone users (λ = 100) than
smartphone users (λ = 58).
TABLE 3. Co-variance analysis of the generated points using poisson
point process.
According to the official statistics, 18% of the peo-
ple who were tested for COVID-19 in Bangladesh were
found positive [47]. So, we have randomly selected 18%
of the points as COVID-19 positive and marked with red
dots in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. Then, we have measured the
Euclidean distance of every point with respect to the red
points (likely COVID-19 positive). Finally, we have counted
the points which were within a 3-meter radius of any of the
Covid-19 positive points. Similarly, we count the same con-
sidering the 2-meter distancing strategy. The contact tracing
performance comparison for a maximum of 3-meter distance
is shown in Table 4. Here, we can see that for each of the
four trials, the count of contact tracing using any type of
mobile phone is higher than that of smartphone users. During
the trials, the highest percentage of change with respect to
smartphone users is 300% and the lowest is 100%. The
average count of contact tracing for any type of mobile phone
users and smartphone users is 20 and 7.75, respectively. These
observations clearly show the effectiveness of the proposed
tracing strategy.
TABLE 4. Contact tracing comparison for maximum 3-meter distance.
The contact tracing comparison for a maximum of 2-meter
distance is shown in Table 5, where we again notice that
for each trial, the count of contact tracing using any type of
mobile phone is higher than that of smartphone users. During
the trials, the highest percentage of change with respect to
smartphone users is 266.67% and the lowest is 60%. The
average count of contact tracing for any type of mobile phone
users and smartphone users is 9.5 and 4.25, respectively.
TABLE 5. Contact tracing comparison for maximum 2-meter distance.
These two contact tracing comparisons are depicted graph-
ically in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10.
Next, we extend the performance comparison to the case
of two other countries, e.g. India and South Korea because
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FIGURE 9. Pairwise contact tracing comparison considering the maximum
3-meter distance.
FIGURE 10. Pairwise contact tracing comparison considering the
maximum 2-meter distance.
South Korea is ranked at the top of the list for smartphone
usage (95%) and India at the last (24%) based on the total
population [48]. In India, 24% of the total population use
smartphones, 40% people use mobile phones that are not
smartphones and 35% people do not use any mobile phone
at all. Therefore, we simulate the data for India with the
density parameter, lambda (λ) = 24 for smartphone-only
users and lambda (λ) = 64 for any kind of mobile phone
users. On the other hand, in South Korea, 95% people use
smartphones and 5% use a mobile phone that are not
smartphones. So, for South Korea, we consider the density
parameter, lambda (λ) = 95 for smartphone-only users and
lambda (λ) = 100 for any kind of mobile phone users.
According to COVID-19 case statistics for both the countries,
it is found that in India, 4.16 % of people were found positive
after test [49] and it is 1.06 % in South Korea [50]. We have
used these percentages to consider the COVID-19 positive
points. The country-wise contact tracing performance of
existing and proposed schemes is shown in Fig. 11. From
Fig.11, it is noticeable that the count of contact tracing is
higher for most of the time when any type of mobile phone
users’ geolocation is considered than smartphone-based apps.
FIGURE 11. Country wise average contact tracing count comparison.
FIGURE 12. Country-wise comparison on percentage of change with
respect to only smartphone users.
The percentage of changes with respect to smartphone users
for each of the countries is also given in Fig. 12
VI. CONCLUSION
To slow down the spreading of the deadly virus termed as
the novel Coronavirus, there is no alternative to finding out
the infected persons as well as those who came into close
contact with an infected person, then taking proper measures.
Considering this fundamental approach, many countries have
already developed contact tracing applications which are
showing promising results but with significant privacy con-
cerns. In this article, we have addressed the privacy issue
by avoiding any smartphone-based apps for contact tracing
through wireless connectivity (e.g. Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, NFC,
etc.). The proposed model uses mobile users’ geolocation
data directly from the mobile operators. By doing so the
overall contact tracing performance improves significantly
while preserving users’ privacy.
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